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ABSTRACT

The background of New Zealand's Taskforce to Review Education Administration (the Picot Taskforce) which reported its findings and proposals in May 1988 is outlined. Described are the intended radical devolutions of power, resources, and responsibilities to institutions. The paper foreshadows the replacement of the Department of Education by a new compact Ministry and suggests how counterpressures could emerge to create unexpected outcomes in school governance. Appended are 36 references and seven tables with related information and comments. (SI)

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NEW REFORM DIRECTIONS

FOR

EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN NEW ZEALAND

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This paper outlines some of the background and the proposals of the Picot Taskforce which reported in May 1988. It then describes the intended radical devolution of power, resources and responsibilities to institutions. It foreshadows the replacement of the Department of Education by a new compact Ministry and suggests how counter pressures could emerge to create unexpected outcomes in school governance.

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NEW REFORM DIRECTIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN NEW ZEALAND

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This paper outlines some of the background and the proposals of the Picot Taskforce which reported in May 1988. It then describes the intended radical devolution of power, resources and responsibilities to institutions. It foreshadows the replacement of the Department of Education by a new compact Ministry and suggests how counter pressures could emerge to create unexpected outcomes in school governance.

BACKGROUND

The Current System

New Zealand has a national education service[1] administered by sector. The University Grants Committee (UGC) advises the Government and distributes allocated resources to seven universities which have their own Acts and governing bodies. The six teachers colleges and 22 polytechnics are administered by the Department of Education's Head and Regional offices, and while they have governing councils, the degrees of discretion they have vary and are contested. Special schools are controlled and administered by the Department of Education's Head and Regional Offices.

The 349 State secondary schools have Boards of Governors that act within the personnel, curriculum and resources policies determined in the Centre. Some schools that traverse the primary-secondary divide have Committees of Management with unique but less powers than Boards of Governors since they are also responsible to District Education Boards.

Similarly, the 2377 State primary schools have school committees and are controlled and administered by one of the 10 Education Boards, one of the three Regional Offices and the Head Office of the Department of Education. Pre-school kindergartens and playcentres are administered by the Head Office of the Department of Education with Education Boards providing support services. The Kohanga Reo (Maori `language nest') pre-schools are autonomous and funded via the Department of Maori Affairs.

Political versus Administrative Cultures

In New Zealand, traditional political action has been regional or local in nature. It was settled by largely independent Maori whanau (extended families) who networked as hapu (tribes) and iwi (confederations). The European settlers, who had an eye to local and provincial advantages rather than to national interests, set up ten Education Boards to administer their local primary schools.[2]

In 1877, in the decade after the end of the Land Wars, New

Zealand's provincial assemblies handed over responsibility for education to the newly formed national government. The 1877 Education Act was modified in 1914 to centralise the inspection of schools and curriculum development. In the decades since there have been a series of reports that have led to the establishment of universal secondary education, universities and the polytechnics, as well as curricular and pedagogical reforms. Four educational myths or mega-policies have dominated policy making since the 1880s: selective support; equal opportunity; equal outcomes; and most recently, equal power.[3]

Although purposes have changed significantly, the structures and practices of governance and administration in education have remained much as they were settled back in 1877. As each era brought new problems and new initiatives, the Department of Education elaborated its structure with new sections, new divisions and new levels.

Conversely, New Zealand has tried hard to obtain responsive political and administrative systems. It dispensed with its `Upper House' in the 1940s and today has a uni-cameral and unitary political system with three year parliamentary terms. In such a system, the linkages between cause and effect, the consequences of political intervention, and the outcomes of concentrating power, are all very transparent.[4] Generally, however, centralism has remained in bad odour; "New Zealanders resent going to Wellington to get permission to live."[5]

Nevertheless, the national education system developed a counter-vailing administrative culture of centralism. It drew its strength from the personalities of national figures, controls exerted through examination, inspection and curriculum development systems, an enduring public belief in the quality of primary education, macro economic forces for national problem solving, and the power of symbiotic bureaucracies; the Department of Education and the teachers' unions.

Client dissatisfaction grew and participation in educational administration became a policy issue.[6] Professor Sir Frank Holmes[7] called for an "educational consumers' institute." Respected Parliamentarians[8] recalled that by the early 1980s, half their mail was about problems in education, despite the best efforts of teachers and administrators. The consultative style of the new Labour Minister appointed in 1984, the Hon Russell Marshall, helped to abate some of the pressure but did not attend to a fundamental cause; the mismatch between political and administrative cultures in public education.

Political Intervention

The Parliamentarians intervened in 1986. A bipartisan Science and Education Select Committee reported[9] that the quality of teaching was being undermined by: `provider capture', that is, where the providers of education had captured the terms of their service; grossly elaborated structures with muddled lines of

accountability and communication, and; obsolete administrative attitudes and practices. They called for major changes.

The Education Establishment did not respond. The Hon D Langes' Government suffered electorally in 1987. The Picot Taskforce was asked[10] to provide a review of administrative functions to maximise delegation, an evaluation of governance to accelerate devolution, a reorientation of administrative services to enhance client satisfaction, and a reorganisation of structure to achieve greater effectiveness, efficiency and equity.

Despite some claims to the contrary, the Picot exercise was not a cost-cutting exercise. The process cost just under $400 000, additional monies were found for marketing and implementation, and savings stayed in the portfolio.

It was one of 17 taskforces set up by the Cabinet Social Equity Committee chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, the Hon G Palmer. The charters of these taskforces and that of Sir Ivor Richardson's Royal Commission on Social Policy overlapped and straddled all social portfolio responsibilities. This approach provided gradual and contestable advice, and ensured that proposals cohered with ex-Law Professor Palmer's views[11] on the integrated reform of constitutional, administrative and social policies.

THE PICOT REPORT

Assumptions

The Picot Taskforce noted[12] that the combined effects of new technology, changing and plural values, new cultural sensitivity, and the intensifying demands on education services had outstripped the administrative capacities of the system. They assumed the need for greater responsiveness. They also assumed that this could be achieved with appropriate incentive regimes at all levels for system and institutional managers.

Since there was bipartisan support for major structural reform and radical devolution, the Picot Taskforce's thinking went well past relocating administrative functions closer to the client, the fairly common horizontal extension of bureaucracy usually and euphemistically referred to as 'decentralisation.'

Members came to believe that the devolution of decision-making power, resources and accountability was an effective means of altering the balance of power between the providers and the clients. Further, they assumed that this would lead to greater institutional, and hence, system responsiveness.

Findings

The Picot Taskforce found[13] that despite the heroic efforts of

teachers and administrators, the management of public education had inappropriate features: over-centralised decision making; too many decision points; high vulnerability to pressure group politics; excessive ministerial intervention; and a culture of centralism and dependence. They showed that the Department of Education "holds together because of the personal integrity of the management and their collective commitment to education rather than through any sound management structure, systems, or practice."[14]

The management systems, according to Picot, had complex and fragmented structures and processes, relied on arbitrary institutional roles and poor information, and had wasteful duplications. Accountability systems measured fidelity to administrative regulations rather than how effectively educational aims had been achieved. Opportunity cost analysis was buried by input economic thinking. The CSEC was told that the themes of low efficiency and undermined effectiveness were linked to client dissatisfaction and to the alienation of disadvantaged groups.

Reform Strategy

Picot opted for radical devolution to reinforce the professionalism and dedication of individual teachers, parents and community participants. He did this by focussing on the organisational unit that sustains the relationship between

learner and teacher; the school or college.

The primary strategy adopted was to alter the balance of power between clients and providers at institutional level to gain greater responsiveness. Key measures included reforming governance at all levels, local empowerment and dispersing as many functions as possible from `the Centre.'

In a White Paper, Tomorrows' Schools,[15] the Government formally accepted almost all of Picot's ideas, laid out an implementation process, and set the 1st of October 1989 as the changeover date.

New Governance and Administrative Policies

Prior to the changeover date, each school community is to elect a Board of Trustees that will negotiate a Charter of Objectives to reflect local needs within national guidelines. The Charter will need to be approved by a new Ministry before it becomes the basis for program budgeting and accrual accounting, since each school is to manage its own finances.

A national Audit and Review Agency is to provide multi-skilled teams every two years to make transparent how well each school has used its funds to meet chartered objectives. A Parent Advocacy Council is proposed as a check on the tyrannical use of majority power or bureaucratic position. The ten Education

Boards will go. Community Education Forums and Education Service Centres will evolve to provide consultative and school support services.

Ad hoc policy taskforces will be used rather than establish a national education policy council. A slim Ministry will provide policy advice, administer property, move funds, and develop personnel, administrative, governance and curriculum guidelines.

Implementation

Major strategies have included a short-term $400 000+ public relations campaign, short-life working parties, and inservice activity to help administrators acquire financial management and program budgeting skills. A good deal of `paper progress' has been made with the preparation of guidelines by the Implementation Working Parties. The foreshadowed encouragement of private support services and the wider involvement of other voluntary parties has yet to occur.

More broadly, since administrative reforms usually create new problems in time, it is also appropriate to stand back from these events to identify possible sources of conflict and unintended outcomes to help those charged with the responsibility of policy implementation. It might also help "researchers evaluate outcomes rigorously to ensure that policy makers move away from the processes of implementation, back to

the fundamental questions of purpose and rightness"[16] in public education.

SOME SOURCES OF COUNTER-PRESSURES

Role Loss and Discovery

The numbers of staff required at 'the Centre' will fall. The ten Education Boards will go. The new Education Service Centres and schools will only recruit mobile personnel with contractable skills and understandings.

Displaced persons will have to let a part of their professional selves be implicitly devalued and die when their organisation disbands. Applied research[17] has shown that people in organisations that have been rationalised go through the grief of a bereavement before they begin to find a place in an alternative and dimly perceived organisational future. Second, despite being vulnerable, they will have to openly negotiate the value of their professional service. Third, and another new experience for most, will be formative and comparative performance evaluation. It is almost inevitable that feelings of disaffection will be channelled into collective activity.

Predictable outcomes could include the formation of peer support groups, the polarisation of attitudes about management reforms,

and attempts by organised teachers to link disaffection to the importance of professionals defining client needs. Some teachers will have opportunities to use the new purchasing power of institutions to steer the selection of staff, services and management in the Education Service Centres. Counter-balancing strategies might include the development of effective middle management leadership in institutions and community-based resource policies.

A great deal hangs on the majority voting power of parent Trustees. It has already become a prime target for opposition. The legislation was held up with problems about defining `parent or care-giver' in non-nuclear families, suggesting that an effective legislative program might have been placed earlier in the implementation process.

In general, however, the teachers' unions will be able to exploit a significant amount of residual resistance to private enterprise ethics in their service profession. Market and corporate metaphors in education will be an easy target until they, or their equivalents, have been embedded into the lexicon of New Zealand educational administration.

Disturbed Bargaining Relationships

Another area destined for controversy concerns professional appointments and promotions. Boards of Trustees are to be

responsible for the appointment of principals on contracts, who in turn will recommend the appointment of assistant teachers. Principals, with a board member and a teacher from another school, will select senior staff. Promotion to senior grades as a `teacher of outstanding merit' has also been suggested as a means of strengthening the crucial nexus between influence and quality teaching[18] in schools.

National negotiations will continue to establish the parameters of salaries and conditions. Trustees will have discretion on salary levels within grades, while principals will be empowered and held accountable for the day-to-day management of institutional life. However, the teachers' unions, like all effective organisations, will need to protect their integrity. Since member activity recreates their power base, they can be expected to lobby for greater homogenuity rather that for greater differentiation and competition between members.

It therefore has to be expected that trustees and unions will quickly identify `anomolies,' `inconsistencies,' and eventually `injustices' and `inequities' consistent with "New Right ideology."[19] Logs of claims will move from the parameters and details of formulae to the need for recentralised personnel practices and for more standardised conditions of service. The foundation to claims will be the selected principle of equity; for clients and between professionals.

There are many other pressures and dynamics involved. For example, the teachers' unions dislike contracts for principals and their deputies on the grounds that they will disturb the collegiate relationship between teachers and those in positions of responsibility. On the other hand, the Post Primary Teachers' Association's anti-contract campaign can be linked to a shrinking membership base as the artificial effect of higher retention rates fade, and to a likely division in membership should principals and deputies discover other means of representing their interests.

The critical path of the Implementation clearly anticipated that the teachers' unions would try to capitalise on fears about local power-sharing and the perceived loss of hard-won national protections of working conditions. A successful process gained provisional support for the trialling of governance reforms in schools.

It appears at this stage that the partly careerist slogan of `equity' indicates a counter-vailing force to that represented by the management slogan of `responsiveness.' It will, therefore, be important to look beneath the slogans to determine the extent to which policy outcomes have served educative interests; the longer-term interests of learners and New Zealand society.

The Supply of Expertise

The number of students entering each teachers college will be determined by its Trustees, not, as in the past, by the Department of Education. There will be no guarantees of employment after training. Despite the lead times involved, it was assumed by Picot that the market would clear.

Similarly, many primary school Principals are concerned[20] about the availability and expertise of trustees and administrative support staff in rural communities. They note new financial management responsibilities and other situationally specific problems. Many have called for leadership development inservice education that addresses felt needs, accepts and proceeds from a wide range of current mindsets, offers negotiable curricula, and establishes and sustains supportive professional networks during and beyond implementation.

The point here is that as soon as supply problems emerge, the affected schools, communities, teacher groups and the teacher training institutions can be expected to lobby for reregulation. Although client interests might initially favour more effective incentive regimes, they are likely to switch support to the centralist strategies that are more widely favoured in order to serve their immediate interests.

The Loss of Trust in the Portfolio

It was noted above how the Parliamentarians had despaired of Education putting its house in order. It also transpired that the White Paper, Tomorrow's Schools, was an invitation that teachers could not afford to refuse. Lange emphasised his Cabinet's determination to introduce legislation if the teachers' unions did not co-operate without disrupting the education of the students in schools.[21] This, perhaps inevitably, created a well of ill-will. It deepened when a non-educator was appointed as the lead change agent, and by the perceived absence of a credible education statesperson who could give the changes an educative rather than simply a management rationale.[22]

The teachers' unions were also able to capitalise on an emotional backlash in the profession when the effects of a highly effective print and video public relations programme began to wear off. The conclusion drawn here is that there is a widely sensed need for a national explanation that can straddle and endure all of the implementation phases, and that can translate into an educational justification for the new organisation. There is a crisis of purpose emerging.

Displacing Educative Leadership with Managerial Technicism

The only major casualty in the Picot proposals was the Education Policy Council. Instead, "As the need arises, the Minister will establish task forces to assist with policy development for

limited periods of time. There will be no permanent independent body established to formulate policy."[23]

One medium term danger of this decision is that the responsible politicians and their appointees will focus on the short-term and technical facets of problems in education rather than build philosophical expertise in education policy analysis. They could also tend to see alternative policy advice from within as disloyal criticism, and set up conditions that will lead to irregular and radical changes on party political lines. There is a need to encourage system and institutional leaders to become educational state-persons.

With disestablishment scheduled for the 1st of October, there are also major morale problems in the Department of Education, that is, among the very personnel expected to implement the Picot philosophy with enthusiasm. Compounding these effects is something of a vacuum of educative leadership with dwindling numbers of Education role models available to principals at 'the Centre.' Primary Principals[24] recently emphasised this point while acknowledging the change management expertise of the new Director General, a change agent from Forestry, and the leader of the Implementation Unit, who came to Education some years ago from Treasury.

An associated issue concerns how the changes required freshly selected and relocated appointees to work in ways that would

demonstrate the stylistic and philosophical distance between the old and the embryonic organisation. However, the emphasis on the radical nature of the reforms might have been less effective than typifying the changes as the more widespread adoption of exemplary and demonstrably educative forms of administration.

This issue has local equivalents. The most widely shared sentiment among primary school Principals[25] in November highlighted their deep need to have their service affirmed and legitimised in educational terms. Whatever their views of the new policies, the Principals surveyed were ideologically professional rather than technical. Their language signalled that they had been socialised as `chalkies,' not as managers. In typical vernacular, "the principal should be the leading professional" since "schools are for kids." It also means that management training is more likely to be effective if it imparts technical skills directly related to the educative leadership of professionals,[26] to collaborative planning by the body corporate,[27] and to professionally informed trustee-based policy making.[28]

Principals are also concerned that the impetus of reform could be lost due to the timelags between implementation events or be undermined by apparent policy contradictions; such as when the anticipated funding for self-determined management education was retained and deployed by `the Centre.'

To summarise to this point, the impact of counter-vailing forces to successful implementation will be largely determined by their origins: the loss of professional self-esteem; doubts over the supply of new expertise; new limits to collective bargaining practices; fading trust, purposes and educative legitimation; and an alienating managerial technicism. Their effects will be particularly evident as school governance practices diversify.

VARIATIONS IN SCHOOL GOVERNANCE

It has been imputed[29] from the major policy documents that New Zealand institutional managers will have four major parts to their new role; facilitating governance, corporate planning, educative leadership and management services. The first area, facilitating school governance, usefully illustrates how some of the counter-vailing forces noted above will make their presence felt.

Undermine Policy Making as Philosophy-in-Action

The first effect of the counter-vailing forces noted will be to distort the philosophical aspects of school policy making. Boards of Trustees will have a primary concern for the overall policy that their Principal, as Chief Executive Officer of the Board, will implement. As an ex-officio member of a Board, it is assumed that each Principal will possess a number of

philosophical skills to help others use desirable ways and means of making right decisions.

In brief, this implies being able to: appreciate the relativity of the cultures of the school, the school community, the region and the society; analyse, understand and explain complex policy dilemmas; unravel clashes of values and cultures so that Trustees can make ethically sophisticated judgements; use an advanced knowledge of teaching, learning and educative administration when advocating policy; and use an educative approach to leadership and a sophisticated set of methods to implement policy with professional colleagues.

If a principal suffers from self-doubt, can not acquire supportive expertise, is paralysed by industrial conflict, lacks a sense of being right and feels alienated by instrumental expectations, it is extremely unlikely that she or he will be able to provide the philosophical services required by a Board of Trustees.

Paralyse School Policy Processes

It is important to maintain distinctions between policy making and policy implementation in any organisation. If the philosophical, strategic and political components of policy making are confused with mobilising, managing and monitoring policy implementation in a school, [30] there is little hope of

systematic improvement.

This distinction is also an appropriate basis for a practical working relationship that can accomodate the nature of the powers delegated to Trustees, and the real discretion needed by principals to manage schools on a day-to-day basis. To be specific, the Trustees, including the Principal and an elected staff member, will determine policy. Picot also assumed that the Principal would collaboratively plan policy implementation with professional colleagues using program budgeting.

However, if the counter-vailing forces noted above make a major impression, colleagues would lack a sense of professional responsibility, feel that demands outstrip available capabilities and soon believe that industrial advocacy is the best way of negotiating terms of service. They would also come to assume that distrust and satisfying baseline expectations are professional norms, and see themselves as being on the receiving end of line management. In such circumstances, the Principal would have little immediate prospect of taking up a professional leadership role.

To take a positive note, Picot indicated that the criteria and processes used to hold any appointee accountable for outcomes should reflect the philosophy of the Charter and make a clear distinction between policy making and policy implementation roles. Unfortunately, given the plurality of New Zealand

society, there can be no universal recipe on the separation of powers or on the wisdom of Trustees intervening. The upshot is that each Principal will need to understand these distinctions, and then, how to negotiate a balanced and an achievable role specification that coheres with a Charter of Objectives.

Ideally, such understandings would be written into a contract prior to appointment to protect and respect all proper interests. On the other hand, and this situation is certain to occur and produce some tragic outcomes, there are no means available for Trustees to displace an inherited Principal or a senior staff member who is ineffective, inefficient or inequitable in practice. In such cases a Board might have to develop or acquire alternative modes of professional leadership in their school.

Maldevelop Trusteeship

An early task for the proactive Principal will be to manage the conditions for the election of a Board of Trustees. The technical tasks include identifying the electorates, explaining the composition, role, support, and powers of the Board, and then acting as returning officer. The appropriate political role for the principal during this phase could well include making contact with local educational statespersons, eg. kaumatua (Maori elders), to disseminate information, and to encourage discussion about expertise without being compromised

as the guardian of democratic process.

Once the Board of Trustees are elected, the principal will be expected to help the Trustees prepare the institution's Charter within national guidelines and agreements for education. This would mean drawing on the philosophical, planning and political skills noted above since the draft Charter has to define the purpose of the institution, the intended outcomes for students, and, how programmes will take account of students' and potential students' interests, staff strengths, as well as community resources and interests.

On the other hand, for a Principal to accept a dominant leadership role at this point would undermine the learning of educative governance and the emergence of community leadership. A subtle form of informed process facilitation is advocated since there will be ample opportunity for the Principal to articulate a preferred position. Cultural sensitivity and a low-key expertise in collaborative and strategic planning techniques will be at a premium.

Assisting planning in a setting of possibly unfamiliar yet direct democracy in a wider context of plural interests also means helping arrange bilateral, horizontal and vertical negotiations in a range of cultural modes. Situationally appropriate group processes will be needed to emphasise inclusive and informed problem solving with the longer-term

interests of the students and New Zealand society set as the touchstone of decision making.

It can almost go without saying that such an approach presumes that colleagues have few doubts about their professional competance or industrial position, that there is an organisational culture of trust and positive reinforcement, and that leadership is enabling and educative.

Limiting Access to Resources

A politically astute Principal will also have to acquire supportive resources and be able to interpret national guidelines for the Trustees. By arranging appropriate linkages, for example, the Department of Education's liaison group could work with community and staff elders to find policies for the school that resolve seemingly diverse national and local expectations. Another example would be to make the findings of applied research on staff selection criteria and procedures[31] available to Trustees when the task faces them for the first time.

If the prevailing climate is, however, characterised by a low levels of professional and support expertise, adversarial relationships and damaged self-esteem, distrustful monitoring and mechanistic management, there is little chance of an effective, efficient and equitable approach to resource problem solving developing.

CONCLUDING NOTE

This paper has summarised the background and the major strategies proposed by the Picot Report. It has argued that the radical devolution of power to Boards of Trustees could well, ironically, help trigger a suite of counter-vailing forces that could seriously challenge the implementation of the New Zealand Government's White Paper on Tomorrow's Schools.

Some major counter-vailing forces were identified as the loss of professional self-esteem, doubts over the supply of new expertise, the disruption to traditional forms of collective bargaining, the evaporation of trust, crises of purpose and legitimation, and the alienating effects of a new managerial technicism.

The expected role of Principals in facilitating governance was used to illustrate how these counter-vailing forces could impact on school governance. It was shown that a Principal will need to be comfortable and competent debating in the abstract realm of ideas about complex situations and alternative policies. Trustees will need the services of an analyst who can synthesise policy and administrative options and identify principles. When the philosophy of the Charter has started to take shape the Trustees will then need their Principal to research and assemble trustworthy information so that the consequences of alternative governance structures and decisions can be estimated as

accurately as possible.

There are many associated issues left unaddressed. This paper could have argued that the Principal's ability to think and plan in strategic terms will be vital. It could have noted that Trustees will also need their Principal to act as an honest broker in the politics of policy making. While it noted something of a vacuum of educative leadership at national levels, it might also have dwelt on the point that Trustees will also need the Principal to become an effective cultural agent, that is, someone who can facilitate effective planning processes, explain and generate support for the emerging consensus, and then marshall the resources and interests that are needed to maximise the possibility of quality policy and commitment.

There is limited critique here of the Picot ideas. Interested observors should also note that the teachers' unions will face a period of substantial internal turbulence as they design new structures that can respond effectively to the proposed radical redistribution of power.

Above all, such is the interest in events in New Zealand in other education systems, it is crucial that a new post-Picot literature of scholarly reflection emerges to prevent uncritical adoption of the Picot ideas outside their unique setting.

Beeby,[32] Cardno,[33] McKenzie[34] and others[35] have started the process by raising fundamental issues about the aims and the ethics of Picot-in-practice. Indeed, such enterprise focussing at system and school level is the nature of effective and educative policy analysis. Administrative policy evaluation is too important to be made vulnerable to the counter-vailing forces of dynamic conservatism.[36]

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OHP 1

GENERAL POLITICAL VERSUS ED ADMIN CULTURES

POLITICAL CULTURE IN NZ	ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE IN EDUCATION
Traditions of localism and provincialism	National education system overlaid in 1877
Uni-cameral, unitary system with some local government powers	Sectorised structures with different patterns of governance
'Fastest Law in the West' and three-year terms of Parliament	Education Act of 1877 revised about every three decades since
Traditions of transparency, anti-centralism, formal Oppositions.	Centralism strengthened by national personalities, examinations, inspections, curriculum, beliefs about success, education as a national problem-solver, power of symbiotic bureaucracies.
Responsive to social, political and economic forces.	Unresponsive to external feedback and given to input economics.

OHP 2

THE SCOTT REPORT 1986

The bipartisan Education and Science Select Committee of the New Zealand Parliament reported that the quality of teaching was being undermined by

'provider-capture' where the providers of education had captured the terms of their service

a grossly elaborated structure, so elaborate that information flows and lines of accountability were confused and confusing

obsolete administrative practices and attitudes

OHP 3

PICOT'S TERMS OF REFERENCE

The Taskforce, one of 17 set up by the Cabinet Social Equity Committee, was asked for

a review of functions to maximise delegation

an evaluation of governance to accelerate devolution

a reorientation of administrative services to enhance client satisfaction

a reorganisation of structure to achieve greater effectiveness, efficiency and equity

OHP 4

PICOT'S ASSUMPTIONS AND FINDINGS

The Taskforce assumed that

rapid changes in the context required a responsive administrative culture in education

responsiveness could be achieved by appropriate incentive regimes for managers

the devolution of decision making, resources and accountabilities would alter the balance of power between providers and clients and make institutional and system administration more responsive

The Taskforce found

over-centralised decision making, too many decision points and great distances between problems and powers

vulnerable to presssure group politics and excessive Ministerial intervention

structural fragmentation, complexity, incoherence, with arbitrary roles and sectors

accountabilities vague and inappropriate

"Bad System, Good People"

OHP 5

PICOT'S REFORM STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Strategy

radical devolution of governance to school or college to alter power between providers and clients

radical devolution of resources allocation, many personnel and curriculum functions to institutions

Tactics

Elected Boards of Trustees and Charters of Objectives

Collaborative Program Budgeting and Accrual Accounting

National Audit and Review Authority

Parent Advocacy Council

Community Education Forums

Education Service Centres

Slim Ministry of Education to provied policy advice, administerproperty, move funds and develop guidelines for other functions

OHP 6

SOME SOURCES OF COUNTER-PRESSURES

Role Loss and Discovery

Disturbed Bargaining Relationships

The Supply of Expertise

The Loss of Trust in the Portfolio

Displacing Educative Leadership with Managerial Technicism

OHP 7

VARIATIONS IN SCHOOL GOVERNANCE

Undermine Policy Making as Philosophy in Action

Paralyse School Policy Processes

Maldevelop Trusteeship

Limit Access to Resources